Replication Data for: The regional consequences of authoritarian power-sharing: Politburo representation and fiscal redistribution in China

Much political economy research examines how higher-level political representation of the constituent jurisdictions affects resource redistribution among the lower-level units in democracies, but little work has probed the redistributive consequences of regional political representation under dictatorship. This study investigates the effect of membership for provincial officials in the Politburo of the single-ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on fiscal resource flows between the central government and provincial governments in reform-era China. I find robust evidence that the provinces overseen by CCP Politburo members tended to remit more budgetary revenues to the center but did not receive larger central budgetary subsidies. This is consistent with a territorial logic of authoritarian power-sharing in single-party states, which suggests that the regionally selective presence at a collective ruling-party decision-making forum for subnational officials aims at tighter political control to help induce greater policy compliance from below.