Dynamic Screening in International Crises

In this paper, I challenge costly signaling theory and present a rival theoretical framework for understanding how states behave and assess resolve in crises. Modeling crisis diplomacy as a war of attrition, I ask how long countries will be willing to participate in costly negotiations and invest in sunk costs and audience costs before going to war or conceding. I show that more resolved states display greater impatience with diplomacy, preferring to fight instead. In turn, the least resolved states prefer to concede quickly to avoid having to fight. Finally, moderately resolved states negotiate longer, pay more sunk costs, and accumulate more audience costs. Consequently, moderately resolved states are more likely to obtain concessions, not because belief in their resolve increases, but because they grant their rival more time to concede. The model also features stalemated negotiations, providing new microfoundations for a common crisis outcome.本文对代价信号理论（costly signaling theory）提出质疑，并提出一套竞争性理论框架，用以解析国家在危机中的行为逻辑与决心评估机制。本文将危机外交建模为一场消耗战（war of attrition），探讨各国在开战或让步前，愿意参与代价高昂的谈判、投入沉没成本（sunk costs）与承担受众成本（audience costs）的时长边界。研究发现，决心更强的国家对外交谈判的耐心更弱，更倾向于直接诉诸武力；与之相对，决心最弱的国家则会选择快速让步以避免开战。而决心处于中等水平的国家则会延长谈判周期，承担更多沉没成本与受众成本。据此，中等决心的国家更有可能迫使对手让步——这并非因其决心的可信度得到提升，而是因为它们为对手预留了更长的让步时间。本模型还覆盖了陷入僵局的谈判场景，为一类常见的危机结局提供了全新的微观基础（microfoundations）。