Data and Code for: Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China’s War on Air Pollution
收藏ICPSR2022-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
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https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/125321/version/V1/view
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资源简介：
We examine the introduction of automatic air pollution monitoring to counter suspected tampering at the local level, a central feature of China’s “war on pollution.” Exploiting 654 regression discontinuity designs based on city-level variation in the day that monitoring was automated, we find an immediate and lasting increase of 35% in reported PM10 concentrations post–automation. Moreover, automation’s introduction increased online searches for face masks and air filters that are strong predictors of purchases. Overall, our findings suggest that the biased and imperfect information prior to automation led to suboptimal investments in defensive measures, plausibly imposing meaningful welfare costs.<br><br>
提供机构：
University of Chicago, Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics; The University of Hong Kong; University of California-San Diego, and London School of Economics and Political Science; Stanford University, and National University of Singapore
创建时间：
2022-01-01
