Replication Data for: Why Kill Deposed Leaders? Regime Types and Post-Tenure Fates

Past research has argued that leaders care about their post-tenure fates and that consideration of these circumstances can motivate policy choices. But, so far, there has been little theorizing on why some successors let leaders walk away while others meet more dismal ends. I provide a regime-based argument for this variation that predicts that personalist leaders will be more likely to experience negative post-tenure fates (exile, imprisonment, and death) than democratic and other autocratic counterparts. The reason is that personalist leaders' legitimacy is uniquely tied to their personal traits. So long as the former despot is living and near, he poses a threat to his successors. I test my argument on a sample of leaders (1945-2004) and find that the legitimacy argument predicts leader outcomes even while accounting for rival arguments such as a need for retribution, means of exit, militarization of regime, and past history.过往研究表明，领导人会关切其卸任后的命运，而对这类后续处境的考量能够驱动政策选择。但迄今为止，鲜有理论针对"为何部分继任者会放任前任领导人安然离场，而另一些继任者却令前任落得更为凄惨的结局"这一问题展开阐释。本文提出一种基于政权类型的解释框架以阐释这种差异，该框架预测，个人专制型领导人（personalist leader）相较于民主国家领导人与其他威权体制领导人，更有可能遭遇负面的卸任结局——包括流亡、监禁乃至死亡。其原因在于，个人专制型领导人的合法性唯一绑定于其个人特质。只要前独裁者仍在世且具备政治影响力，便会对其继任者构成威胁。本文基于1945年至2004年的领导人样本对该理论进行实证检验，结果显示，即便在控制了报复需求、卸任途径、政权军事化程度以及过往历史等竞争性解释变量的情况下，合法性视角仍能有效预测领导人的最终结局。