Replication Data for: Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortune.传统观点普遍认为，封闭式名单比例代表制（closed-list proportional representation, CLPR）会诱使议员优先恪守政党路线，而非遵从选民的诉求。然而即便在该选举制度下，选举激励机制仍可能诱使政党领袖容忍部分议员的“懈怠行为（shirking）”。本研究指出，政党领袖在判定应容忍哪些议员背离政党路线时，会利用选区席位分配不均（malapportionment）所引发的选民相对选举影响力差异。我们据此预测，从席位超配选区（overrepresented districts）当选的议员，其在唱名表决（roll call votes）中背离政党路线的概率将显著高于其他选区选出的议员。本研究依托阿根廷议员的投票记录数据，以及一套用于估算选民与议员在同一意识形态空间中立场定位的独特数据集，对上述论点开展实证检验。研究结果显示，即便在以强化政党团结著称的选举规则框架下，仍会出现为取悦选民而进行的策略性脱党投票行为，这对政党的选举胜算具有积极作用。