Data for: To see is to believe: Common expectations in experimental asset markets

Abstract of associated article: We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a setting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market experiments introduced by Smith et al. (1988). Recent studies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion, which can be reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value. We reconsider this view, and propose that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred, this may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common expectations. Our design disentangles the direct effect of training from the indirect effect of its public knowledge, and our results demonstrate a distinct and statistically significant effect of public knowledge over and above that of training alone.关联论文摘要：本研究在既往研究证实存在非理性行为的实验场景——即史密斯等人（Smith et al., 1988）提出的资产市场实验范式中，通过实验操控被试对他人理性程度的认知信息。近期研究表明，此类市场中的定价偏差可能源于认知混淆所导致的实验假象，而通过训练受试者理解基础价值的递减规律可缓解该现象。我们重新审视这一观点，并提出：若训练行为已成为公开周知的信息，则可进一步降低被试对他人行为的不确定性，助力共同预期的形成。本实验设计将训练的直接效应与其公开化带来的间接效应加以区分，实验结果显示，相较于仅接受训练的组别，公开训练信息这一操作具有显著且独立的统计学效应。