Data from: Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions

Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated
individuals when they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals
then need to use a conditional strategy to deter their interaction
partners from defecting. Responding to defection such that the future
payoff of a defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called
a partner control mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i)
to switch from cooperation to defection when being defected (‘positive
reciprocity’), (ii) to actively reduce the payoff of a defecting partner
(‘punishment’), or (iii) to stop interacting and switch partner (‘partner
switching’). However, such mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often
studied in isolation from each other. In order to better understand the
conditions under which each partner control mechanism tends to be favoured
by selection, we here analyse by way of individual-based simulations the
coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner
switching. We show that random interactions in an unstructured population
and a high number of rounds increase the likelihood that selection favours
partner switching. In contrast, interactions localized in small groups
(without genetic structure) increase the likelihood that selection favours
punishment and/or positive reciprocity. This study thus highlights the
importance of comparing different control mechanisms for cooperation under
different conditions.