Monetary Exit Strategy and Fiscal Spillovers

The paper models strategic monetary-fiscal interactions in the aftermath of the global financial crisis – in a single country as well as a monetary union. It depicts both the short-term (stabilization) perspective and the long-term (sustainability) perspective, and the link between them. This is done in a game theoretic framework that allows for revisions of actions, deterministic or stochastic. In addition, we consider incomplete information about economic conditions, and different types of government. We find that, under ambitious fiscal policies, a legislated long-term monetary commitment may: (i) reduce the risk of a double-dip recession and deflation in the short-term, and at the same time (ii) facilitate the 'exit strategy' of monetary policy, prevent sub-optimally high future inflation caused by fiscal spillovers. Our analysis thus implies that an explicit numerical target for average inflation may play the role of a monetary 'credibility insurance' over all phases of the business cycle, and is beneficial especially in countries facing fiscal stress.

本文针对全球金融危机后的战略货币-财政互动关系构建理论模型，分析场景涵盖单一主权国家与货币联盟两种情形。本文同时覆盖短期（稳定目标）视角与长期（可持续性）视角，并揭示二者之间的内在关联。该分析基于允许行动修正的博弈论框架，该框架支持确定性与随机性两类行动修正模式。此外，本文还纳入了经济状况信息不完全以及异质性政府类型的分析设定。研究发现，在财政政策趋于激进的情境下，立法层面确立的长期货币承诺可达成双重目标：其一，降低短期双底衰退与通货紧缩的风险；其二，助力货币政策"退出策略"的实施，防范财政溢出效应引发的未来次优偏高通胀水平。据此，本文的分析表明，明确设定的平均通胀数值目标，可在经济周期的所有阶段发挥货币"可信度保险"的作用，尤其对面临财政压力的国家而言裨益显著。