Replication Data for: Parliamentary questions as strategic party tools

This article shifts the analysis of parliamentary oversight tools to the level of the political party, asking how political parties make use of written parliamentary questions. It theorises that the use of parliamentary questions is related to the ideological and electoral competition between political parties, borrowing from theories on issue competition and negative campaigning. It provides an empirical test, using data on written questions from the lower house in the Netherlands (1994–2014). The analysis shows that parties tend to put questions to ministers whose portfolios are salient to them, in line with issue ownership theories. Moreover they ask questions of both ministers from parties that are ideologically distant and those with whom they have considerable electoral overlap in line with studies of negative campaigning.本文将议会监督工具的研究视角转向政党层面，探讨政党如何运用书面议会质询这一履职手段。本文借鉴议题竞争与负面竞选相关理论，提出核心理论命题：议会质询的使用与政党间的意识形态竞争、选举竞争存在显著关联。本研究以荷兰众议院1994年至2014年的书面质询数据为基础开展实证检验。分析结果显示，政党倾向于就自身核心关切的内阁部门职权范畴，向对应大臣提出质询，这与议题归属理论的研究结论一致。此外，政党会同时向意识形态相距甚远的政党所任命的大臣，以及与自身存在显著选举重叠的政党所任命的大臣提出质询，这契合负面竞选相关研究的发现。