Replication Data for: The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence

Central bank independence (CBI) solves the time inconsistency problem faced by policymakers with respect to monetary policy. However, it does not solve their underlying incentives to manipulate the economy for political gains. Unable to use monetary policy, and often limited in their ability to use fiscal spending, governments can resort to financial deregulation to generate short-term political benefits. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that governments systematically weaken financial regulations in the aftermath of CBI, and that the effect of CBI is separate from an ideological shift toward liberalization. Our findings suggest that the growing financialization of the economy experienced by many countries over the last few decades is partly a by-product of central bank independence.中央银行独立性（Central bank independence, CBI）可解决政策制定者在货币政策制定过程中面临的时间不一致性问题。然而，这并不能消除政策制定者为谋取政治利益而操纵经济的潜在动机。由于无法动用货币政策工具，且财政支出权限往往受到限制，各国政府可借助金融放松管制以获取短期政治收益。我们通过定性与定量分析证明，各国政府会在推行中央银行独立性后系统性地弱化金融监管，且该效应与向自由化转向的意识形态偏移相互独立。研究结果表明，近数十年来多国普遍出现的经济金融化趋势，在一定程度上正是中央银行独立性带来的副产品。