Why do we punish? On retribution, deterrence, and the moderating role of punishment system

We investigate whether individuals’ punishment behavior aims at compensating for inflicted harm (i.e., retribution) or at deterring the offender from committing the offense again (i.e., deterrence), and whether punishment motives depend on the punishment system. Implementing a strategy method, participants (N = 150) can assign punishment for each possible decision of an allocator in a group resource allocation task under three conditions: Open punishment (the allocator knows about the punishment, allowing for retribution and deterrence); hidden punishment (the allocator does not know about the punishment, precluding deterrence); and unintentional offense (decision is made by the computer not the allocator, precluding retribution and deterrence). Contrasting punishment in the hidden punishment and unintentional offense condition reveals retribution, whereas contrasting punishment in the open and hidden punishment condition reveals deterrence. We further examine whether punishment motives depend on whether individuals punish in a decentralized or centralized punishment system. unknown other