Revolving doors in Europe: does hiring from the public sector facilitate access?

In recent years, the movement of personnel from the public sector to interest groups has garnered considerable attention throughout Europe. Consequently, there has been an increased focus on the phenomenon of revolving door lobbyists within academic literature. This research contributes to this scholarly discussion by examining how the employment of such lobbyists facilitates access. We argue that interest groups gain advantages by recruiting individuals from the public sector in policy domains with limited mobilization, but this benefit decreases as more interest groups mobilize. Our analysis of survey data from seven European political systems supports these expectations, indicating that recruiting professionals with experience in the public sector enhances access, especially in policy areas with minimal lobbying activity. This highlights the potential for interest mobilization to counterbalance the advantages of hiring revolving door lobbyists.近年来，公职人员从公共部门流向利益集团的现象在欧洲各地引发了广泛关注。因此，学术文献中对旋转门说客（revolving door lobbyists）现象的研究关注度亦随之提升。本研究通过探究此类说客的聘用如何提升政策准入机会，为该学术议题的讨论作出贡献。我们提出：在游说动员程度较低的政策领域中，利益集团通过聘用公共部门出身的人员可获得竞争优势，但随着参与游说的利益集团数量增多，该优势会逐渐减弱。我们对七个欧洲政治体的调研数据进行分析后，结果支持上述理论预期：聘用具备公共部门工作经验的专业人员确实能提升政策准入机会，尤其在游说活动极少的政策领域中这一效果更为显著。这一发现凸显了通过强化利益游说动员来抵消聘用旋转门说客所获优势的潜在可能。