Replication Data for: \"Agenda Control and Timing of Bill Initiation: A Temporal Perspective on Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies\"

Although democratic governance imposes temporal constraints, the timing of government policymaking activities such as bill initiation is still poorly understood. This holds especially under coalition governments, in which government bills need to find approval by a partner party in parliament. We propose a dynamic temporal perspective, in which at the beginning of a term ministers do not know whether they face a cooperative or competitive partner but they learn this over time and use their agenda control to time further bill initiation in response. A circular regression analysis using data on more than 25,000 government bills from 11 parliamentary democracies over 30 years supports this temporal perspective, showing that ministers initiate bills later in the term when their previous bills have experienced greater scrutiny. Ministers further delay bill initiation when coalition parties' incentives to deviate from compromise increase and when they have less power to constrain their bills' scrutiny.尽管民主治理存在时间维度的约束，但学界对法案发起等政府决策活动的时间安排仍缺乏深入理解。这一情况在联合政府治理下尤为突出：在此类体制中，政府法案需获得议会中伙伴政党的批准方能推进。我们提出一种动态时间视角：在议会任期伊始，内阁部长并不清楚其合作对象是协作型还是竞争型政党，但会随着时间推移逐步明晰这一状况，并借助自身的议程控制权，据此调整后续法案发起的时间安排。本研究使用覆盖11个议会制民主国家、跨度30年的2.5万余份政府法案数据开展循环回归分析，结果验证了上述动态时间视角：当内阁部长此前提出的法案受到更严格的议会审查时，其会在任期内更晚的节点发起新法案。此外，当联合政府伙伴背离既定妥协方案的动机增强，或是内阁部长自身缺乏足够权力限制其法案所承受的审查力度时，部长们会进一步推迟法案发起的时间。