Replication Data for: Unemployment, Central Bank Independence, and Diversionary Conflict

According to the diversionary use of force literature, unemployment as an indicator of poor economy should increase the likelihood of diversionary conflict. I argue, however, leaders do not engage in such conflict unconditionally simply when unemployment is rising. Whether worsening unemployment leads to diversionary conflict depends on the availability of policies that can alleviate the condition. Only when such policy availability is low, will diversionary conflict become more likely as unemployment deteriorates. When ameliorating policies are available, unemployment should reduce the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Focusing on central bank independence (CBI) as a primary mechanism that shapes the availability of policies that tackle unemployment, I expect that high CBI encourages the use of diversionary conflict as unemployment surges. An augmented zero-inflated negative binomial analysis of an updated militarized dispute dataset for the period 1975-2013 lends strong and robust support to this theoretical postulate. The causal mechanism is also empirically validated.依据转移型武力使用相关研究文献，失业率作为经济疲软的衡量指标，本应提升转移型冲突的发生概率。然而笔者认为，国家领导人并不会仅仅因失业率上升就无条件发起这类冲突。失业率恶化是否会引发转移型冲突，取决于缓解失业困境的政策是否具备可获得性。唯有当这类纾困政策供给不足时，失业率恶化才会推高转移型冲突的发生概率；反之，若存在可行的纾困政策，失业率上升反而会降低转移型冲突的发生概率。 本文将中央银行独立性（central bank independence, CBI）作为影响失业纾困政策供给的核心机制，提出如下假说：当中央银行独立性较高时，失业率飙升会促使国家更倾向于动用转移型武力冲突。针对1975-2013年更新后的军事化争端数据集开展的扩展零膨胀负二项模型分析，为该理论假说提供了稳健且强有力的实证支持，其背后的因果机制同样得到了实证验证。