The trust broker game: a three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry

This paper experimentally investigates trust and trustworthiness in a repeated and sequential three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. It adds to the existing literature by combining experimental features from recent work in the trust game. The authors use random variations in the multiplier value, a third player without an initial endowment, undisclosed termination rules, and variations in information availability related to transactions. The framework is novel in that the game continues even if the first player transfers no amount to the second player. Using participants from India, the results are broadly consistent with past evidence on the trust game. All players are more trusting when information of their transfers and earnings are made available to other players. The third player (termed the \"trust broker\") transfers a larger amount when information on transfers is disclosed to other players. The authors find that information availability leads to a significant increase in the trust broker’s reciprocity, as defined by the amount that is returned to Player 2. Social desirability, cultural contexts, and learning effects are discussed in terms of scope for future research.本论文通过实验方法，探究了带有概率性回报与信息不对称特征的重复序贯三人信任博弈（trust game）中的信任与可信性问题。本研究结合了近期信任博弈领域实验研究的多项特色设计，丰富了现有相关文献。研究者采用了多项实验操控手段：乘数取值的随机变动、无初始禀赋的第三方参与者、未公开的博弈终止规则，以及与交易相关的信息可获得性差异。该实验框架具有创新性：即便首位参与者未向第二位参与者转移任何资金，博弈仍可继续进行。本研究以印度招募的受试者为实验对象，所得结果与既往信任博弈相关研究的证据大体一致。当所有参与者的转移金额与收益信息对其他参与者公开时，全体参与者的信任程度均有所提升。第三位参与者（被称为“信任中介（trust broker）”）在其转移交易信息向其他参与者公开时，会向第二位参与者转移更高金额。研究者发现，信息可获得性的提升会显著增强信任中介的互惠行为——此处互惠行为以返还给第二位参与者的金额作为衡量标准。研究最后还就社会期许偏差、文化语境与学习效应等方向，探讨了未来研究的可行空间。