Replication Data for: Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. The present analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature.在议会民主制国家中，政府权力的交替更迭往往伴随漫长的谈判过程，各政党领袖会围绕新内阁的组成结构与政策目标展开磋商博弈。尽管此类延误可能对政治与经济领域造成显著影响，但学界对其背后的决定因素却知之甚少。此外，现有为数不多的相关研究还得出了相互矛盾的结论。本文针对1944年至1998年间西欧16个国家的政府组阁时长展开研究，探讨不确定性与谈判复杂度相关因素所产生的影响。研究结果契合本文的理论预期：提升内阁类型可接受性不确定性的因素，始终会延长政府组阁的耗时；而诸如政党数量、立法机构内意识形态极化等会增加谈判复杂度的因素，则仅在政治行为体间存在足够不确定性的情况下，才会引发组阁延误。本研究有助于厘清现有文献中相互矛盾的研究结论。