Replication Data for \"When Do You Get Economists as Policy-Makers?\"

Stata data and do files to reproduce analysis (Stata 14.2). Abstract: We analyze when economists become top-level “economic policy-makers,” focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country’s leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.可复现本次分析的Stata数据与do文件（Stata 14.2）。摘要：本研究聚焦金融危机与国家领导人的党派属性，探讨经济学家如何跻身顶级经济政策制定者（economic policy-makers）行列。我们构建了一套全新数据集，收录了1973年至2010年间40个发达民主国家的1200名政治领导人、财政部长与中央银行行长的教育与职业背景信息。研究发现，左翼领导人任命的经济政策制定者在经济学领域接受过更系统的训练，其任命的财政部长则更少有私人金融行业从业背景，但更有可能曾担任中央银行官员。在金融危机期间任命的财政部长，其拥有金融服务业从业背景的概率更低。领导人自身是否接触过经济学训练，同样与其人事任命决策相关。这表明，影响经济政策的关键机制之一，正是通过选拔特定类型的经济政策制定者来实现的。