Replication Data for: The Power of Compromise: Proposal Power, Partisanship, and Public Support in International Bargaining

In an era of increasingly public diplomacy, conventional wisdom assumes that leaders who compromise lose the respect of their constituents and damage their reputations, which undermines the prospects for peace and cooperation. This paper challenges this assumption and tests how leaders can negotiate compromises and avoid paying domestic approval and reputation costs. Drawing on theories of individuals' core values, psychological processes, and partisanship, I argue that leaders reduce or eliminate domestic public constraints by exercising ``proposal power'' and initiating compromises. Employing survey experiments to test how public approval and perceptions of reputation respond to leaders' strategies across security and economic issues, I find attitudes toward compromise are conditioned by the ideology and partisanship of the audience and the president, with audiences of liberals and Democrats being more supportive of compromise and Republican leaders having greater leeway to negotiate compromises. These contributions suggest that leaders who exercise proposal power have significant flexibility to negotiate compromise settlements in international bargaining.