Replication Data for: Elite selection in single-party autocracies: Minimizing protests and counterproductive state violence to maintain social stability

Forthcoming in Political Research Quarterly Abstract: Why are some but not other officials selected for promotion in single-party regimes? Understanding inner-elite dynamics of these regimes is important for explaining their resilience. Recent evidence suggests that these polities prioritize patronage connections over competence, when deciding who receives advancement at the top echelons of power hierarchy. By contrast, this paper proposes that, besides patronage, competence (demonstrated as an official’s ability to maintain social stability) also contributes to the promotion of top officials. While it is widely acknowledged that social stability is a key concern for autocracies, prior quantitative research on career outcomes of single-party elites has largely ignored this criterion for promotion. We argue that evaluating officials based on their ability to minimize protests demonstrates another dimension of competence (in addition to economic growth) that is designed to address the problem of authoritarian control, i.e., managing popular discontent. We test this argument in the context of China, using a sample of 116 party secretaries in 2003–2017 who faced a total of 10,085 labor protests. Our findings are consistent with this argument.即将发表于《政治研究季刊》（Political Research Quarterly）的论文摘要：为何一党制政权中仅有部分官员而非全部能获得晋升？理解这类政权的精英内部动态，对于解释其执政韧性至关重要。近期研究表明，这类政体在顶层权力梯队的晋升决策中，更优先考量庇护关系而非履职能力。与之相对，本文提出，除庇护关系外，官员维持社会稳定的能力所体现的执政水平，同样可助力其获得高级职务晋升。尽管学界普遍认可社会稳定是威权政权的核心关切，但此前针对一党制精英仕途发展的量化研究，大多忽略了这一晋升评判标准。本文认为，基于官员减少抗议活动的能力评估其履职表现，展现了除经济增长之外的另一项能力维度——该维度旨在解决威权管控难题，即应对民众不满情绪。本文以中国为研究场景，选取2003至2017年间的116名党委书记作为研究样本，上述官员累计遭遇10085起劳工抗议事件。研究结果印证了本文的核心论点。