Replication Data for: Trade Plants the Flag: Sanctions-busting and the Signing of New Preferential Trade Agreements

Why does the imposition of trade sanctions sometimes lead to the signing of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between target countries and their trade partners? I argue that the occurrence of trade-based sanctions-busting behavior increases the likelihood of signing new PTAs despite the pressure from senders of sanctions. The notion that “trade plants the flag” explains how firms that bust sanctions lobby their home governments for signing PTAs to secure their first-mover advantage in a sanctioned market. By using rare event models and weighting methods, this empirical analysis of data from 1950 to 2006 reveals that firms’ rent-seeking behavior is the driving force of seeking PTAs especially during multilateral trade sanctions. Thus, this finding can illuminate sanctions agenda as firm-level transactions may serve as a determinant of state-led institutionalized cooperation after the execution of sanctions.为何实施贸易制裁有时会促使受制裁国与其贸易伙伴签署新的特惠贸易协定（preferential trade agreements, PTAs）？本文提出，尽管会面临制裁发起国的施压，但基于贸易的规避制裁行为的增多，会提升受制裁国与贸易伙伴签署新特惠贸易协定的可能性。“贸易追随旗帜”（trade plants the flag）这一概念阐释了规避制裁的企业为何会游说本国政府签署特惠贸易协定，以巩固其在受制裁市场中的先行优势。本文基于1950年至2006年的数据集，采用稀有事件模型（rare event models）与加权方法（weighting methods）开展实证分析，结果显示：企业的寻租行为（rent-seeking behavior）是推动各国寻求特惠贸易协定的核心驱动力，这一效应在多边贸易制裁期间尤为显著。据此，本研究结论可为制裁相关议题提供新的研究视角：企业层面的贸易往来可作为制裁实施后国家主导的制度化合作的决定因素之一。