Replication Data for: Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game -- democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.唯有政治体系内所有相关行为体均恪守政治博弈的制度规则，民主统治方能维系——民主制度必须具备自我实施性。本研究探讨透明度对维系民主均衡的作用。透明度可优化选举运行机制：在透明政体中，选举能更有效地化解公众与统治者之间的逆向选择（adverse selection）问题。透明度还能提升民众对民主制度的满意度，并抑制针对民主秩序的挑战。本研究构建了博弈论模型对上述主张进行检验，结果显示这些主张得到了经验证据的支持。透明度与民主政权垮台概率以及民主领导人被非常规罢免概率的下降均存在相关性，透明度能够稳固民主统治。