Market-Protecting Institutions and the World Trade Organization's Ability to Promote Trade

Recent research has shown that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), contrary to common perceptions, does not increase trade. We argue that the effect of the GATT/WTO on dyadic trade flows is conditioned by the strength of market-protecting institutions (MPIs), which are the fundamental determinant of transaction costs. Dyads with weak MPIs do not see an increase in trade from GATT/WTO membership while dyads that have strong MPIs do see an increase in trade from GATT/WTO membership. In the former case, the benefits of GATT/WTO membership are outweighed by the high risk of doing business under weak market protection, but when property rights are well protected, GATT/WTO membership contributes positively to international trade. Empirical analysis of bilateral trade flows from 1948 to 1999 supports this hypothesis.已有研究表明，与普遍认知相悖，关税与贸易总协定（General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade，GATT）/世界贸易组织（World Trade Organization，WTO）并未直接促进贸易增长。本研究认为，GATT/WTO对双边贸易流量的影响，取决于市场保护型制度（market-protecting institutions，MPIs）的强弱——而后者正是交易成本的核心决定因素。市场保护型制度薄弱的国家对偶，无法从GATT/WTO成员国身份中获得贸易增长收益；而市场保护型制度完善的国家对偶，则可实现贸易增长。就前者而言，GATT/WTO成员国身份所能带来的收益，会被市场保护薄弱环境下开展商贸活动的高风险所抵消；唯有当产权保护完善时，GATT/WTO成员国身份才能对国际贸易产生正向促进作用。基于1948年至1999年双边贸易流量的实证分析，验证了上述假说。