Replication data for: Do better monitoring institutions increase leadership quality in community organizations? Evidence from Uganda

We offer a framework for analyzing the impact of monitoring --- a commonly recommended solution to poor leadership --- on the quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations in low-income countries. In our model, groups may face a trade-off between leader ability and effort. If the group's ability to monitor the leader is low, then the leader may exert too little effort. A higher level of monitoring increases leader effort, raising the value of the public good. However, more intense monitoring may also drive higher ability members to opt-out of candidacy, reducing public goods value. The result is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. The trade-off between leader effort and ability, however, only exists in the presence of sufficient private income opportunities. These predictions are assessed using original data gathered from Ugandan farmer associations.我们提出了一套分析框架，用于探究监督——这是针对领导力薄弱问题的通用解决方案——对低收入国家社区组织中民选领导者素质的影响。在我们的模型中，群体可能需要在领导者能力与努力程度之间做出权衡：若群体对领导者的监督能力不足，则领导者可能投入过少的努力。更高强度的监督能够提升领导者的努力程度，进而提高公共品的价值；但与此同时，更严苛的监督也可能促使能力更强的成员放弃参选，从而降低公共品的整体价值。由此可见，监督强度与公共品价值之间呈现倒U型的非线性关系。不过，领导者努力程度与能力之间的权衡关系，仅在群体拥有充足的私人收入机会时才会存在。我们利用从乌干达农民协会收集的一手原始数据，对上述理论预测进行了实证检验。