Replication Data for: Once Bitten, Twice Shy? Investment Disputes, State Sovereignty, and Change in Treaty Design

More than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) provide foreign investors with substantive protections in host states and access to binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In recent years, states increasingly have sought to change their treaty commitments through the practices of renegotiation and termination, so far affecting about 300 IIAs. The received wisdom is that this development reflects a “backlash” against the regime and an attempt by governments to reclaim sovereignty, consistent with broader antiglobalization trends. Using new data on the degree to which IIA provisions restrict state regulatory space (SRS), we provide the first systematic investigation into the effect of ISDS experiences on state decisions to adjust their treaties. The empirical analysis indicates that exposure to investment claims leads either to the renegotiation of IIAs in the direction of greater SRS or to their termination. This effect varies, however, with the nature of involvement in ISDS and with respect to different treaty provisions.逾3000项国际投资协定（IIAs）可为外国投资者在东道国提供实体保护，并使其可诉诸具有约束力的投资者-国家争端解决（ISDS）机制。近年来，各国愈发倾向于通过重新谈判与终止条约的方式调整其条约承诺，目前已有约300项国际投资协定受到此类调整的影响。学界普遍认为，这一趋势反映了对该机制的"反弹"，亦是各国政府为收回主权所做出的尝试，这与当前更广泛的逆全球化浪潮相契合。本研究依托关于国际投资协定条款对国家监管空间（SRS）限制程度的全新数据集，首次系统性探究了投资者-国家争端解决（ISDS）相关经历对各国调整其投资条约决策的影响。实证分析结果表明，遭遇投资索赔的国家，要么会朝着扩大国家监管空间的方向重新谈判相关国际投资协定，要么直接终止此类协定。不过，这一效应会因各国在ISDS中的参与性质以及不同条约条款的差异而有所不同。