Replication Data for: Board on the Job: Public-Pension Governance in the U.S. States

Though elected officials have the final say over pensions, boards of trustees also influence plan governance. Not a great deal is known about boards or how they shape policies. Boards are composed of politically and non-politically appointed members, as well as active and retired employees. Plan active-employee size turns out to be the best predictor of membership, suggesting that employee voice expands as plans cover more workers. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variables approaches, I show how boards shape plans' policies and funded levels. Active and retired members shape discount rates, while active membership is positively associated with funded ratios. Interestingly, political gridlock is also associated with higher discount rates. However, I find that plans' actual investment returns are poor predictors of expected returns, irrespective of board composition. While boards offer a venue through which states can manage funds, they are not suited to solving pensions' governance challenges alone.尽管民选官员对养老金计划拥有最终决定权，但受托董事会（boards of trustees）同样会对计划治理产生影响。目前学界对这类董事会及其如何塑造计划政策的认知仍较为有限。此类董事会由政治任命、非政治任命的成员，以及在职与退休雇员共同组成。研究发现，计划的在职雇员规模是董事会成员构成的最佳预测指标，这表明随着计划覆盖的劳动者数量增加，雇员的话语权也随之扩大。本文同时采用固定效应（fixed effects）与工具变量（instrumental variables）两种研究方法，阐释了董事会如何影响计划的政策制定与资金充足率水平。在职与退休雇员成员会对贴现率（discount rates）产生影响，而在职成员规模与资金充足率呈正相关关系。值得注意的是，政治僵局同样与更高的贴现率水平相关。不过本文研究发现，无论董事会构成如何，计划的实际投资回报率都无法有效预测预期回报率。尽管董事会为各州管理养老金资金提供了治理平台，但仅依靠董事会并不足以解决养老金领域的治理难题。