<b><i>"IKS and AI: Philosophical and Ethical Challenges in the Age of Intelligent Machines"</i></b>

This paper advances the thesis that <i>Chit</i>—pure, self-luminous consciousness—occupies a position of ontological and epistemological primacy within Indian Knowledge Systems (IKS), particularly in Advaita Vedānta and allied non-dual traditions. Contravening Cartesian dualism and empiricist epistemologies of Western modernity, the paper posits <i>Chit</i> not as a function of cognition or neurobiological emergence, but as the onto-epistemic substrate of all phenomena—simultaneously grounding <i>being</i> and <i>knowing</i>. Drawing upon śruti-based hermeneutics, the study explores how <i>Chit</i> is not merely an epistemic tool but the very precondition of epistemicity itself: <i>svayam-prakāśa</i> (self-revealing), <i>nirvikalpaka</i> (non-conceptual), and <i>adhyastābhāsa</i> (appearing through superimposition).Methodologically, the paper adopts a comparative framework that places Advaitic metaphysics in dialogue with contemporary phenomenology and post-Kantian continental thought. Through a critical interrogation of Heidegger’s <i>Dasein</i>, Husserl’s <i>intentionality</i>, and Merleau-Ponty’s <i>pre-reflective awareness</i>, the analysis reveals how Indian non-dualism bypasses the subject-object dichotomy by establishing <i>Chit</i> as a non-relational ground—a position more radical than the phenomenological reduction.Further, the study engages with pramāṇa theory and its treatment of valid cognition to show that in Indian epistemology, consciousness is not object-directed but reflexively foundational. In contrast to the externalist and representationalist accounts of modern epistemology, <i>Chit</i> is neither inferentially validated nor inferentially displaced—it is <i>self-certifying</i> (svataḥ-prāmāṇya).Ultimately, the paper suggests that reclaiming <i>Chit</i> as a metaphysically and epistemically foundational category allows for the construction of alternative, indigenous philosophical architectures that speak directly to the global crisis of meaning, consciousness, and reality. This onto-epistemic reframing of Indian philosophy challenges hegemonic paradigms and opens fertile grounds for trans-civilizational knowledge discourse in the 21st century.本论文提出核心论点：识（Chit）——即纯粹自明的意识，在印度知识体系（Indian Knowledge Systems，IKS）中，尤其在吠檀多不二论（Advaita Vedānta）及相关非二元传统内部，占据存在论与认识论的首要地位。本研究悖逆西方近代的笛卡尔二元论与经验主义认识论框架，主张识（Chit）并非认知功能或神经生物学层面的突现产物，而是一切现象的存在论-认识论基底——同时为“存在”（being）与“认知”（knowing）提供终极根基。 本研究依托基于天启圣典（śruti）的诠释学传统，深入探究识（Chit）何以不仅是一种认知工具，更是认知可能性本身的先验前提：它具备自明性（svayam-prakāśa）、无分别性（nirvikalpaka）与假立显现（adhyastābhāsa）的核心特质。 在研究方法上，本论文采用比较研究框架，将吠檀多不二论形而上学与当代现象学及后康德大陆哲学展开深度对话。通过对海德格尔的此在（Dasein）、胡塞尔的意向性（intentionality）以及梅洛-庞蒂的前反思意识（pre-reflective awareness）展开批判性审视，本分析揭示了印度非二元传统如何通过将识（Chit）确立为一种非关系性基底，从而彻底规避了主客二分的认知困境——这一立场较现象学还原更为激进。 此外，本研究还探讨了量论（pramāṇa theory）及其对有效认知的阐释框架，以阐明在印度认识论体系中，意识并非指向外在对象的认知活动，而是具有反身性的基础性存在。与现代认识论的外在论与表征论路径截然不同，识（Chit）既无需通过推理得以证成，也不会被推理所消解——它具有自证有效性（svataḥ-prāmāṇya）。 最终，本论文指出，将识（Chit）重新确立为形而上学与认识论的基础性范畴，有助于构建替代性的本土哲学体系，可直接回应全球范围内的意义危机、意识困境与现实迷思。这种存在论-认识论层面的印度哲学重构，挑战了西方中心的霸权式认知范式，并为21世纪的跨文明知识话语开辟了广阔的发展空间。