Replication Data for: Geographically-Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems

Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems use geographically-targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office and if so, how? Despite its use in twenty eight countries around the world today, little research has addressed this question. We explain how MMM's combination of electoral rules and unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large and small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both. Once in government, we explain how parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically-targeted spending to cement it. We test our propositions using original data from Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016). In both cases, we find that municipalities in which supporters split their ballots as instructed received more money after elections. Our findings have broad implications for research on MMM, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico, respectively.