Replication Data for: Informing the Leader: Bureaucracies and International Crises

Whether international crises end in conflict frequently depends on the information that
leaders possess. To better explain how leaders acquire information, I develop and test
an informational theory of bureaucracies during crises. Time-constrained leaders
delegate information collection to advisers who lead bureaucracies. A division of labor
between bureaucracies breeds comparative specialization among advisers. Some
emphasize information on adversaries' political attributes which are harder to assess;
others stress military attributes which are easier to assess. Bureaucratic role thus
affects the content and uncertainty that advisers provide. I use automated and
qualitative coding to measure adviser input in 5,400 texts from US Cold War crises. As
hypothesized, advisers' positions affect the information and uncertainty they convey,
but not the policies they promote as canonical theories suggest. For individuals
advising leaders during crises, what you know depends on where you sit.
Consequently, the information leaders possess hinges on which bureaucracies have
their attention.