Replication Data for: (In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family

The analysis is based on a nationwide survey of Italian rural households conducted by the Italian Institute of Agricultural Markets (ISMEA 1995) in collaboration with the Italian Statistical Institute and designed by Federico Perali according to the theoretical framework of collective household models (UNECE 2007, The Wye Group Handbook Rural Households’ Livelihood and Well-Being, https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/pages/rural/files/9.0_Complete_Publication.pdf, Ch. X.3 and X.4. CH. IX.8.3 is devoted to the ISMEA survey. Federico Perali served as a member of the Wye Group). We use a sample of 726 families in which both spouses are employed and earn a market wage. The farm-household survey combines information on household and farm characteristics, agricultural production and profits, stylized time use, off-farm labor income, governmental and intra-household transfers, consumption including the consumption of assignable goods, and information on the degree of autonomy in decision-making by household members. A relevant feature of our data is information on the private consumption of assignable goods such as clothing for women and men, which is sufficient to identify the bargaining power defined in equation (13), a concept that corresponds to the sharing rule governing the intra-household allocation of resources. The empirical implementation of the household bargaining process is based on a collective family enterprise model (Matteazzi, Menon and Perali, 2017, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1093/aepp/ppw004).