Replication data for: A Dynamic Calculus of Voting

We construct a decision-theoretic model of turnout, in which individuals maximize their subjective expected utility in a context of repeated elections. In the model a nonnegative signaling motivation to vote exists for all citizens, regardless of their ideology or beliefs about the closeness of the election, and is proportional to a citizen's external efficacy, patience, and electoral pessimism. We find tentative support for all three effects in an empirical model of turnout using NES data (1976-1988). This paper suggests that the signaling motivation may play a role in a citizen’s decision to vote.我们构建了一个针对选民投票率的决策理论模型，该模型中个体在重复选举的场景下最大化其主观期望效用。在该模型中，所有公民都存在非负的投票信号动机，无论其意识形态或是对选举胜负胶着程度的认知如何，且该动机与公民的外部效能感（external efficacy）、耐心程度以及选举悲观情绪呈正相关。我们基于1976-1988年的全国选举研究（National Election Studies, NES）数据构建投票率实证模型，为上述三种效应均找到了初步的实证支撑。本研究表明，投票信号动机可能会对公民的投票决策产生影响。