Data and Code for "Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability"

This is the data and code accompanying the article "Hurricanes,
Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability", by Stefano
Gagliarducci, M. Daniele Paserman and Eleonora Patacchini, in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.<br>Article abstract: This
paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies
that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits.
Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to
2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts
impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental
legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on
political circumstances: only those in safe seats can change their
political agenda towards policies that involve short-term costs for
long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral
incentives in shaping politicians’ attitudes towards far sighted policy
making.<br><br>