Considering institutional type: a varieties of capitalism approach to the economic growth resource curse

Defined by North (1994) as the “rules of the game”, over the last few decades, many scholars have sought to understand whether quality institutions can alleviate the Resource Curse (the idea that natural resource abundance hinders rather than promotes economic growth). However, with this focus on quality, few papers have addressed the question of institutional type, and its Curse mitigating properties. This paper, via utilising the associated data, contributes towards filling this gap. Using the Varieties of Capitalism framework, we test whether certain institutional typologies possess the ability to mitigate the Resource Curse and perhaps even turn it into a blessing. Specifically, Rougier and Combarnous’ cluster analysis, “The Diversity of Emerging Capitalisms in Developing Countries” (2017), whereby nations are assigned various institutional typologies is used to create our primary (dummy) independent variables of interest in this study. The remaining control variables essential for ...道格拉斯·诺斯（Douglass North，1994）将制度界定为"游戏规则"。近数十年来，诸多学者致力于探究优质制度是否能够缓解资源诅咒（Resource Curse）——即自然资源丰裕反而抑制而非推动经济增长的命题。然而，既有研究多聚焦于制度质量维度，鲜有文献探讨制度类型及其缓解资源诅咒的作用特质。本文依托相关数据集，旨在填补这一研究空白。本文采用资本主义多样性（Varieties of Capitalism）分析框架，检验特定制度类型是否具备缓解资源诅咒乃至将其转化为发展红利的能力。具体而言，本文运用鲁吉耶（Rougier）与孔巴努斯（Combarnous）2017年发表的《发展中国家新兴资本主义的多样性》一文中的聚类分析（cluster analysis）方法，依据该研究为各国赋予的各类制度类型标签，构建本研究关注的核心虚拟自变量（dummy independent variables）。其余用于……的核心控制变量