Replication Data for: Leadership and Incentives

Paper abstract: We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment with four treatments, where the base treatment was a standard public goods game with simultaneous contribution decisions, and the three other treatments allowed participants to volunteer to be the leader in their group and make their contribution before the others. In the three leader treatments, we manipulated the level of compensation given to the leader. Our main finding is that a moderate compensation to the leader is beneficial; it increases the average contribution relative to both a situation where the leader is not compensated and a situation without a leader. A further increase in the leader compensation, however, is detrimental to public goods provision; it attracts more free riders and creates a social crowding-out effect. Finally, we report from a survey showing that the social crowding-out effect is also present in the population at large. We argue that the main findings of the paper are important in many real-life settings where we would like to use economic incentives to encourage people to lead by example. Two lab experiments on public good provision, both run on a sample of students at NHH Norwegian School of Economics (in 2011 and 2013). Survey data from the general Norwegian population collected in 2013.论文摘要：本研究探讨领导者报酬对公共品供给的影响。本文报告一项包含四种实验处理的实验室实验：基准处理为采用同步贡献决策的标准公共品博弈，其余三种处理允许参与者自愿担任组内领导者，并可率先完成贡献决策。在三种领导者实验处理组中，我们对领导者的报酬水平进行了操控。本研究的核心发现为：对领导者支付适度报酬具有积极作用，相较于领导者无报酬以及无领导者的两种情境，该操作可提升群体平均贡献水平；然而，领导者报酬的进一步提升则会损害公共品供给，这会吸引更多搭便车者并引发社会挤出效应。最后，本文的调查研究结果显示，社会挤出效应在挪威普通大众群体中同样存在。我们认为，本文的核心研究结论在诸多需要运用经济激励手段引导人们发挥表率作用的现实场景中具有重要意义。本研究包含两项公共品供给领域的实验室实验，两项实验均以挪威经济与工商管理学院（Norwegian School of Economics，NHH）的学生为被试，分别于2011年和2013年开展；此外还使用了2013年收集的挪威普通大众调查数据。