Replication Data for: Power-Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace

Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.源于族群不平等待遇的不满情绪，是内战爆发的核心动因。因此，族群权力共享理应降低内部冲突的风险。然而，冲突研究学者对于正式权力共享制度（formal power-sharing institutions）能否有效防范大规模暴力行为尚未达成共识。我们可通过剖析权力共享制度的运行机制，深化对其作用效果的认知。为此，我们将正式权力共享制度对和平的直接影响，与其通过权力共享行为产生的间接影响进行对比分析。我们将包容性制度与地域性分散制度（territorially dispersive institutions）的数据，与权力共享行为的相关信息相结合，在全球范围内对这一关联展开实证评估。我们的因果中介分析（causal mediation analysis）结果显示，正式权力共享制度对族群冲突爆发概率的影响，主要通过该制度所诱发的权力共享行为实现。