Replication Data for: Allocating Political Attention in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Effect of Supranational Agenda-Setters

Supranational bureaucracies are often promoted as a solution to collective action problems. In the European Union context, investing the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with new agenda-setting powers was expected to improve the coherence, continuity and efficiency of foreign policy-making. Relying on novel fine-grained and comprehensive data about the content and duration of working party meetings, the study maps and analyses the allocation of political attention to different foreign policy issues between 2001 and 2014. The results show that the empowerment of the High Representative by the Lisbon Treaty had little immediate effect on the Council’s foreign policy agenda. However, the study also indicates that this result might be due to a lack of capability and ambition rather than weak institutional prerogatives.超国家官僚机构（supranational bureaucracies）常被倡导为解决集体行动问题的可行方案。就欧盟语境而言，授予外交与安全政策高级代表（High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy）全新的议程设定权限，原本有望提升欧盟外交决策的连贯性、持续性与效率。本研究依托针对工作组会议内容与时长的新颖细粒度、全覆盖数据，刻画并分析了2001年至2014年间，政治注意力在各类外交政策议题上的分配格局。研究结果显示，《里斯本条约（Lisbon Treaty）》赋予该高级代表的职权，并未对欧盟理事会的外交政策议程产生显著即时影响。但本研究同时表明，该结果或许源于能力与意愿的匮乏，而非制度权限的孱弱。