Replication data for: Beyond Prices: The Drivers of Farmer Loan Default

Farmers in developing countries are highly vulnerable to exogenous ecological and financial shocks; as a result, policy makers and researchers have become increasingly interested in developing policies and tools that will improve financial outcomes for smallholder farmers. One such instrument is a price-indexed indemnity loan, which forgives the farmer 50% of his loan debt if crop prices fall below a pre-specified threshold. The popularity of this type of loan is grounded in the assumption that price volatility can reduce farmer revenue, which then causes the farmer to default. However, based on data from a randomized field experiment in rural Ghana, we examine whether this assumption is valid; specifically, we empirically investigate the factors that are associated with farmer default. We find preliminary evidence that default rates are more significantly associated with changes in crop quantity, and not crop price. In addition, our analysis suggests that the social context in which loans are offered may play a significant role in whether farmers default. Although we are unable to assert causality between these various factors, we argue that such associations are compelling, and deserve further investigation in future field experiments.发展中国家的农户极易遭受外生生态与金融冲击的影响，为此政策制定者与研究者愈发关注旨在改善小农户财务状况的政策工具。其中一类工具为价格指数化赔偿贷款（price-indexed indemnity loan），即当作物价格低于预设阈值时，可为农户豁免50%的贷款债务。这类贷款的流行基于一项核心假设：价格波动会压缩农户营收，进而引发农户违约。然而，依托加纳农村地区随机田野实验（randomized field experiment）获取的数据，我们对该假设的有效性展开了检验；具体而言，我们实证探究了与农户违约相关的各类影响因素。我们得到的初步证据显示，违约率与作物产量变动的相关性更为显著，而非作物价格。此外，我们的分析表明，贷款发放所处的社会情境或许对农户是否违约具有显著影响。尽管我们无法确证上述各类因素间的因果关系，但我们认为这些关联具有重要的研究价值，值得在未来的田野实验中开展进一步探究。