Impact of IMF Programs on Perceived Creditworthiness of Emerging Market Countries: Is There a “Nixon-Goes-to-China” Effect?

This article examines whether the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on the perceived creditworthiness of a country is conditional on government partisanship. Left-of-center governments tend to suffer from greater credibility problems in financial markets than right-wing governments, because they are typically believed to pursue expansionary policies and have less respect for debt obligations. Applying the conventional wisdom held as “Only Nixon can go to China,” I argue that adopting IMF programs can benefit leftist governments more than other types of governments. The logic of the Nixon paradox implies that market-oriented reforms have greater credibility when implemented by a left-of-center party, whose ideologies do not accord well with the IMF's neoliberal policies, than when implemented by a right-wing party. This is because market participants interpret the action by a leftist government as driven more by a willingness to commit to market-oriented reform than by ideological affinity. Using sovereign credit rating data for almost 90 emerging market countries from 1980 to 2004, I find robust evidence consistent with the “Nixon-Goes-to-China” hypothesis. The findings suggest that adopting IMF programs improves the perceived creditworthiness of leftist governments, whereas no such benefit is found among non-leftist governments.本文旨在探究国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund, IMF）贷款计划对一国市场认知信用可信度的影响是否取决于政府党派属性。相较于右翼政府，中左翼政府往往在金融市场中面临更严重的信用可信度问题，因为市场通常认为中左翼政府会推行扩张性政策，且对偿债义务的重视程度更低。本文借鉴"唯有尼克松方能访华"的传统认知，提出相较于其他类型政府，中左翼政府采纳IMF贷款计划可获得更多收益。尼克访华悖论的逻辑表明，相较于右翼政党，由意识形态与IMF新自由主义政策不甚契合的中左翼政党推行的市场化改革，反而更能获得市场信任。这是因为市场参与者会认为，中左翼政府的此类举措更多源于其推行市场化改革的决心，而非意识形态上的契合。本文使用1980年至2004年间近90个新兴市场国家的主权信用评级数据，得到了稳健的实证证据，与"尼克访华"假说相符。研究结果显示，采纳IMF贷款计划可提升中左翼政府的市场信用认可度，而对于非中左翼政府则未发现此类收益。