Data: Self-Sacrifice for the Common Good under Risk and Competition

This is the database for the article Self-Sacrifice for the Common Good under Risk and Competition. Public service-motivated individuals have a greater concern for the delivery of public services and for the societal consequence of collective inaction, and they see themselves playing a pivotal role in upholding public goods. Such self-efficacy and perceived importance of public service jointly motivate individuals to commit themselves to sacrificing for the common good. Using an incentivized laboratory experiment with a Volunteer’s Dilemma game, which is a well-established stylized variant of a common good setting, we explore the association between self-reported Public Service Motivation (PSM) and voluntary self-sacrifice under different task characteristics and social contexts. We find that risk-taking and intergroup competition negatively moderate the positive effect of PSM on volunteering. The risky situation may reduce an individual’s self-efficacy in making meaningful sacrifice, and intergroup competition may divert attention from the concern for society at large to the outcome of the competition, compromising the positive effect of PSM on the likelihood to self-sacrifice for the common good.