Replication Data for: Off-Cycle and Off-Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government

Who governs America’s cities: organized interests or mass publics? Though recent scholarship finds that local governments enact policies that align with citizens’ preferences, others argue that it is organized interests, not mass publics, that are influential. To reconcile these perspectives, we show that election timing can help shed light on when voters or groups will be pivotal in city politics. Examining 1,600 large US cities, we find that off-cycle elections affect city policy responsiveness asymmetrically, weakening responsiveness on those issues where there is an active and organized interest whose policy objectives deviate from the preferences of the median resident. Here, we focus on public employees interests and find that local governments that are elected off-cycle spend more on city workers than would be preferred by citizens in more conservative cities. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the study of interest groups and representation in local politics.美国城市的治理主体究竟是组织化利益集团（organized interests），还是普通民众群体？尽管近期的学术研究表明，地方政府出台的政策与公民的偏好相一致，但另有学者认为，真正具有影响力的是组织化利益集团，而非普通民众群体。为了调和这两种对立的学术视角，我们提出，选举时机能够帮助厘清在城市政治中，选民或是利益集团何时会成为关键性力量。通过对1600座美国大型城市的分析，我们发现，非常规选举（off-cycle elections）对城市政策回应性（policy responsiveness）的影响具有非对称性：当某一议题存在活跃且组织化的利益集团，且其政策目标与中位居民的偏好相悖时，非常规选举会削弱地方政府在此类议题上的政策回应性。在此研究中，我们聚焦于公共雇员利益集团（public employees interests），并发现：在保守派倾向的城市中，通过非常规选举当选的地方政府，其对城市雇员的财政支出会超出普通公民的合意水平。最后，我们将讨论本研究发现对利益集团与地方政治代表制研究的启示，并以此作结。