Replication Data for: Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States

Terrorist violence has recently led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Yet scholars have only recently begun to examine whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. I test this hypothesis using data on emergency power strength, states of emergency, and the frequency of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.