Monopoly Rents and Foreign Direct Investment in Fixed Assets

In the past two decades, much of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the primary sector has flowed to unconventional, politically risky destinations. This presents a puzzle for theories that emphasize the ex post immobility of—and hence high potential expropriation risk for—fixed asset investment. Existing theories overlook one critical aspect of fixed assets: large capital requirements and high sunk costs act as entry barriers, resulting in market concentration and strong firm incentive for monopoly rent extraction. Personalist dictatorships, we posit, provide an attractive institutional environment for fixed asset investors. In such systems, the control of key economic sectors by the families of leaders, combined with a lack of institutional constraints, facilitate rent-seeking activities. We find that personalist dictatorships receive significantly more foreign investment in the primary sector, and fixed-asset intensive industries in general, than other regimes. This study highlights the importance of accounting for heterogeneity among investors and political regimes to understand the politics of FDI.过去二十年间，第一产业领域的大量外商直接投资（Foreign Direct Investment, FDI）流向了非传统且政治风险较高的目的地。这对于那些强调固定资产投资具有事后不可移动性——进而面临极高征用风险——的理论而言，构成了一个难解的谜题。现有理论忽略了固定资产的一项关键特质：高额资本门槛与沉没成本构成了市场进入壁垒，进而催生市场集中度提升与企业攫取垄断租金的强烈动机。我们认为，个人专制政体可为固定资产投资者提供颇具吸引力的制度环境。在这类政体中，核心经济部门由领导者家族掌控，加之缺乏制度性约束，为寻租活动提供了便利条件。我们发现，相较于其他政权体制，个人专制政体在第一产业以及整体固定资产密集型产业中吸引的外商直接投资显著更多。本研究强调，若要理解外商直接投资的政治逻辑，必须充分考量投资者与政治政体的异质性特征。