Presidential Uses of Force During the Cold War: Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics

This study identifies three methodological issues that affect inferences drawn in studies of presidential decisions to use force: aggregation, truncation, and dynamics. The authors suggest that a dichotomous measure of uses of force introduces aggregation bias, while the decision to examine only major uses of force introduces truncation bias. In addition, they argue that the presence of rivalry creates temporal dependence or dynamics in the use of force series. They re-examine the empirical findings reported in a seminal study of United States presidents' use of force during the Cold War (Ostrom and Job, 1986). The findings demonstrate the importance of these three methodological issues. Results of a Poisson Autoregressive (PAR) model show dynamics in the use of force series. Contrary to Ostrom and Job, the authors find that international variables have a larger substantive effect on the president's decision to use force than political variables like approval and domestic variables like economic performance.