Data for: Tax evasion and public expenditures on tax revenue services in an endogenous growth model

Abstract of associated article: This paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the two main policy instruments affecting tax compliance, namely, the announced tax rate and the share of tax revenues allocated to tax monitoring mechanisms. For doing so, we adopt a simple one-sector endogenous growth model modified under tax evasion following the Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) analysis on income taxes and tax compliance. Our model confirms Barro׳s (1990) theoretical finding stating that the optimal tax rate is equal to the elasticity of public capital. However, introducing a welfare function where governments care also about the degree of fiscal corruption in the economy, the effective tax rate is lower than the output elasticity of public capital in line with Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (1997) theoretical results. Finally, our model is calibrated using data on tax evasion from 35 OECD and 110 non-OECD countries for 2011. Simulation results suggest that both tax evasion and output growth are decreasing with the share of tax revenues allocated to monitoring expenses, while government׳s utility maximization imply an announced tax rate lower from the elasticity of public capital for both groups of countries.关联论文摘要：本文探析逃税行为与影响税收合规的两类核心政策工具之间的关联，即公告法定税率与税收收入中划拨至税务稽查机制的比例。为此，本文沿用Roubini与Sala-i-Martin（1995）针对所得税与税收合规的研究框架，采用经逃税场景修正的单部门内生增长模型（endogenous growth model）。本文模型验证了Barro（1990）的理论结论：最优税率等于公共资本的产出弹性。但若引入同时考量经济体财政腐败程度的福利函数，则有效税率将低于公共资本的产出弹性，这与Futagami等人（1993）及Turnovsky（1997）的理论研究结果一致。最后，本文采用2011年35个经合组织（OECD）成员国与110个非经合组织成员国的逃税数据对模型进行校准。仿真结果显示，逃税规模与产出增长率均随税收收入中稽查支出占比的提升而下降；同时，在政府效用最大化的目标下，两类国家的公告法定税率均低于公共资本的产出弹性。