Replication Data for: Political Geography and Firm Strategies: How Electoral Competition Influences Local Job Creation

Among the many promises made by politicians to their constituents, job creation is universal. Do firms strategically use job creation to exert influence? We take this question to the universe of firms in the United States between 1997 and 2018, linking each subsidiary to a congressional district. We find that firms open subsidiaries in more competitive districts, suggesting that firms employ politicians' constituents as a political strategy to build ties with vulnerable legislators. These patterns are also consistent with electorally insecure politicians exerting more effort to attract firms. Unlike other tools of political influence available to a firm, such as campaign contributions and lobbying, job creation is constrained by geography and time. We show that these patterns exist only for firms in geographically flexible industries, that local job creation increases a politician's electoral survival, and that subsidiary investments are correlated with longer tenures on valuable congressional committees.在政客向选民作出的各类承诺中，创造就业岗位是一项共通的议题。企业是否会策略性地借助创造就业来施加政治影响力？针对这一问题，我们对1997年至2018年间美国境内的所有企业展开研究，将每家子公司（subsidiary）与对应的国会选区（congressional district）进行关联。研究发现，企业会在竞争更为激烈的国会选区设立子公司，这表明企业将雇佣政客的选民作为政治策略，以此与选举处境脆弱的议员建立关联。上述现象同样与选举不稳的政客会付出更多努力吸引企业的情况相符。与企业可使用的其他政治影响力工具（如竞选捐款（campaign contributions）与游说（lobbying））不同，创造就业岗位的行为会受到地域与时间的双重限制。我们的研究表明，上述现象仅存在于地理弹性行业的企业中；本地创造就业能够提升政客的选举连任概率；而子公司投资则与政客在重要国会委员会中的更长任职时长存在相关性。