Brazilian inflation and the Theory of Games

ABSTRACT Based on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the “wait-and-see” behavior of private sector’s price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this “wait-and-see” behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation.摘要 本研究通过对私营部门的细分拆解，拓展了经典的巴罗-戈登（Barro & Gordon）政策博弈模型，识别出私营部门定价主体间的协调乃至合作失灵问题，正是即便在实施通胀稳定政策期间，通胀仍持续存在的潜在诱因。此类通胀持续性至少在短期内，与政府遏制通胀的意愿并无关联。私营部门定价主体的"观望"行为会触发自我实现预言过程，进而可能致使政府放弃通胀稳定政策。破解此类"观望"行为，或是治理慢性高通胀经济体的核心难题之一。