Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia

This paper shows that adding a small application cost to transfer program can substantially improve targeting through self-selection. Our village-level experiment in Indonesia finds that requiring beneficiaries to apply for benefits results in substantially poorer beneficiaries than automatic enrollment using the same asset test. Marginally increasing application costs on an experimental basis does not further improve targeting. Estimating a model of the application decision implies that the results are largely driven by the nonpoor, who make up the bulk of the population, forecasting that they are unlikely to pass the asset test and therefore not bothering to apply.本研究显示，为福利转移项目增设小额申请成本，可借助自我选择机制显著优化项目的精准瞄准（targeting）效果。我们在印度尼西亚开展的村级实验发现，相较于采用同一资产核查（asset test）标准的自动准入机制，要求受益群体主动申请救助，最终覆盖的受益群体经济状况显著更为贫困。在实验框架下小幅提升申请成本，并未进一步优化项目的精准瞄准效果。通过构建并估计申请决策模型分析可知，上述结果主要由占人口绝大多数的非贫困人口驱动：这类群体预判自身无法通过资产核查，因此不愿费心提交申请。