Replication Data for: Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy. Economic Voting in the 2012 Belgian Municipal Elections

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes. KEYWORDS economic voting, local elections, reward and punishment, Belgium经过数十年针对经济投票（economic voting）的研究，学界现已证实，经济状况会影响选民的投票行为。不过这一结论的得出，主要源于对国家级经济体与全国性选举的聚焦研究。本文则证实，在地方层面，与经济相关的问责机制同样发挥作用。以2012年比利时市政选举为例，地方经济环境确实会影响选民投票行为：选民所在自治市的失业率涨幅越高，其投票给现任政党的概率就会显著降低。此外，研究发现选民并不会出于机会主义动机，为那些下调税率的现任政党投票。相反，选民似乎会依据地方经济状况，对地方现任政党进行问责。因此本文得出结论：选民真正关注的是经济成果本身，而非为达成这些成果所推行的具体政策。关键词：经济投票（economic voting）、地方选举、奖惩机制、比利时