Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation"
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w12798
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资源简介：
This essay reviews Bebchuk and Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation". Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2006-12-01
