Replication Data for: U.S. Enforcement Politics and Remittance Dynamics in Mexico

Prior research indicates the enforcement of immigration policy by the host country affects immigrants’ political behavior. Yet, its effect on their economic behavior – namely, remittances – remains understudied. To fill this gap, we theorize on remittances’ political determinants in the host country. In general, we argue remittance flows vary with subnational enforcement of the host country’s immigration policy. In particular, immigrants insure themselves against deportation by remitting more in highly punitive locales. We test our theory in the context of the United States’ Secure Communities program, a nationwide policy involving local-federal partnerships to identify and deport undocumented immigrants. We expect greater remittance inflows to Mexican states with more deportees under the program. Instrumental variable analysis affirms our expectation. Mexican states with more deportees under Secure Communities receive significantly more remittances than other Mexican states. The analysis illuminates the indirect effects of host countries’ enforcement of their immigration policy.