OPPORTUNISM AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALISYS BASED ON GAME THEORY

This data set shows the result of an ab experiment based on game theory. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of “hide behind the small cake” strategy. Our experiment took advantage of the fact that Proposers were informed about the initial endowment, while Respondents were not. In our experiment, the Proposer had the opportunity to deceive by making their offer appear fairer than it really was and without incurring any penalty. The Respondent was only aware of the probability of each possible endowment, which were, in Brazilian Reais: $10 with 0.5 probability; $20 with 0.25 probability; $30 with 0.25 probability. We use the higher probability of a $10 endowment in order to create more opportunities for the Proposer to incur in opportunism if he/she wanted to. Bearing in mind that the Respondent had the power of rejection in the game, self-regarding Proposer would want the Respondent to believe that the size of the pie was equal to $10, the lowest amount in the game. Thus, we investigated the “hide behind a small cake effect” using an ultimatum game framework with imperfect information.本数据集展示了一项基于博弈论的A/B实验结果。我们开展了一项基于博弈论的实验室实验，采用了经过改良的最后通牒博弈（ultimatum game）范式，其中提议者可借助“躲在小蛋糕背后”策略操纵回应者的信念。本实验利用了如下设定差异：提议者知晓初始禀赋额度，而回应者对此毫不知情。在本次实验中，提议者可通过让自身出价看起来比实际更公平来实施欺骗，且不会遭受任何惩罚。回应者仅知晓每种可能初始禀赋的概率，货币单位为巴西雷亚尔：10雷亚尔的概率为0.5，20雷亚尔的概率为0.25，30雷亚尔的概率为0.25。我们设置了更高概率的10雷亚尔初始禀赋，以便在提议者存在投机意愿时，为其创造更多实施机会主义行为的空间。考虑到回应者在博弈中拥有否决权，自利型提议者会希望让回应者相信博弈总蛋糕的价值为10雷亚尔——即本次实验中最低的禀赋额度。据此，我们借助存在信息不完备的最后通牒博弈框架，对“躲在小蛋糕背后效应”展开了研究。